

NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD

THIRD DIVISION

Award Number **20323**
Docket Number *U-20520*

Joseph A. Sickles, Referee

(Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship
Clerks, **Freight Handlers**, Express and Station
Employees)

PARTIES TO DISPUTE: (

(The Western Pacific Railroad Company)

STATEMENT OF CLAIM: **Claim** of the System **Committee** of the Brotherhood (GL-7443) that:

1. **The** Western Pacific Railroad Company violated **the** current Clerks' Agreement at Sacramento, **Yuba City, Oroville, Keddie, Portola**, California and at **Reno**, Nevada, when it deducted two hours' pay **from** their pay checks in the first period of October, 1972; and,

2. The Western Pacific Railroad Company violated the current Clerks' Agreement when **it** failed and refused to allow **em- ployes** **ii. H. Singh, E. E. England, W. L. Fierro, R. C. G-sin, A. N. Giulio, P. Gugliemeno, J. V. Leland, L. J. Lund, W. McCullough, R. M. McClure, J. McPherson, C. B. Miller, J. Perales, T. J. Quinn, F. J. Rapp, W. J. Richard. A. Robinson, F. P. Semenza, L. B. Shields, A. Skootsky, N. B. Stevenson, E. Sutter, M. L. Ward, G. C. W-r, L. Wells, L. J. Wheeler, R. G. Williams, E. L. Wuelfing and E. V. Ziegler** overtime compensation for attending Books of Rules classes **outside** the assigned hours of their regular **assignment** on August 28, 1972; and,

3. The Western Pacific Railroad Company violated the current Clerks' Agreement when it refused to allow **employees** at Stockton Yard **overtime** rate for attending Books of Rules classes outside the assigned hours of their regular **assignments** various dates between July 31 and September 20, 1972.

4. The Western Pacific Railroad Company shall now be required to allow compensation claimed for all involved **employees** set forth in paragraphs **(1), (2) and (3) supra.**

OPINION OF BOARD: In July, 1972, Carrier posted a bulletin which re- quired Claimants to attend Rules Instruction Classes on the Operating Book of Rules; **which** book of rules became effective July 1, 1972.

All Claimants attended the classes, either **on** rest days or after assigned working hours. **It** appears that at the classes, Claimants were advised to submit claims for overtime compensation for their attendance.

Certain Claimants did receive compensation at the **overtime** rate, **however**, the Carrier subsequently deducted **the** premium pay. **Other** claims for **overtime** compensation were disallowed. In all instances, Claimants received straight **time** compensation for **attendance** at the classes.

The Organization alleges violations of various rules **which** provide for premium pay **for "time"**, "work" and/or "service" rendered in excess of eight hours per day, in excess of forty hours per week, on assigned rest days, etc. Claimants urge **that** because attendance at the classes was mandatory, they were required to attend the sessions in the **same manner** that they would be required to protect regular assignments. Accordingly, they relied upon rules of the Agreement require **payment** of premium rates.

The Carrier concedes that Claimants attended classes outside of regular **hours**, but defends its refusal to pay premium pay on the ground that no **section** of the Schedule Agreement provides for such compensation under **the** circumstances present in this **dispute**. In addition, the **Carrier** cites a *number* of Awards supporting its contention.

The Carrier **further** states that nothing in the Rules Agreement requires a payment of **any compensation** for attendance, but straight time payments were made gratuitously by the Carrier because the employees devoted certain time on other than scheduled duty **hours**.

Initially, the Board notes that the Agreement between the parties contains no provision **which** specifically provides for compensation for attendance at Rules Instruction Classes. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the Board to determine if the words **"work"**, "service" and "time", as contained in the premium pay portion of the Agreement, are broad enough to include the type of situation here under consideration.

The Organization cites certain Awards dealing with requirements for attendance at certain functions. In Second Division Award 1438 (**Swacker**), employees were required to attend an investigation on their own time. The Carrier argued that there was no rule **which** required compensation, however, the Board **noted an** elementary principle

of law of contracts dealing **with** employers and employees stating that if an employer calls an employee to performs service, there is created an implied agreement to compensate, and the claim was sustained. **In Award 3462 (Messmore)**, a similar result was reached. Consistently, **in** Award 4790 (Robertson), an employee instructed to attend a Regional Conference cm his day off **successfully prosecuted** his claim because of the finding of very little **mutuality** of interest. See also, Award **10062** (Daly) and 18957 (**Edgett**).

However, **none** of the Awards brought to out attention have sustained claims **framed** in the **same** context as the dispute now before us.

For **example**, in Award 7577 (**Shugrue**), the Board noted:

"There is no conflict **in** the awards of this Division on the question of whether attending rule re-examinations classes constitutes 'work' or 'service' as those words **are** used in the rules here involved. **Careful examination** of other **awards** cited are **not** found to be applicable to the situation existing in this docket. We have held that attending rules **re-examination** classes is not the 'work' or 'service' referred to in the applicable rules which could give rise to a valid **claim** for **over-time** payments. Awards 773 **and** 487.

Whether or not we **feel** that appropriating **an employe's time** in this **manner**, absent **of** course a specific rule, is fair or just **is** not for us to say for **this** Board does **not sit** as a court of equity. We are limited to interpreting **the** applicable Agreement provisions as they stand. It would be exceeding our statutory function to allow **compensation** where the Agreement itself does not authorize it. We do not believe it to be the prerogative of this Board to attempt to do so by reading into the rules **something** that is not **there**. We feel that the **employe's** recourse **is** to negotiate with the **carrier** under Section 6 of the Railway **Labor Act**."

Similarly, the Board, in denying a similar claim, in Award 4250 (**Carter**) stated:

"To recwer **compensation** for attending class lectures on operating rules, such right must be found from the language of the Agreement. Awerde 2828, 3302.

This **Board** does not sit as a court of equity. We just interpret the applicable Agreement provisions as they were drawn by the parties. It would be a usurpation of authority to allow compensation to an **employee where** the Agreement does not authorize it. The **remedy is** by negotiation **and** not by faulty interpretation. .

The quoted portion of Article VII does not authorize compensation for attending class lectures on rules. The statement therein contained that '**employees** notified or called to perform work not continuous with the regular work period' precludes **any notion** that it was intended to include attendance of class lectures on operating rules. The word 'work' as herein used was never intended to have such a generic meaning as the Organization here contends."

In Award 10808 (Moore), it was noted that there are **exceptions** to time consumed by an employee when directed by the Carrier as being considered "work" or "service." One of those exceptions was held to be where the **circumstance** contains a **mutuality** of interest. **The** Award concluded that, "Awards have held **that** classes on operating rules **and** safety rules are such exceptions." See also, Award 11048 (**Dolnick**), 15630 (**McGovern**), Fourth Division Awards 2385 and 2390 (**Seidenberg**), 7631 (Smith), 11567 (**Sempliner**) and Public **Law** Board No. 194, Awards 24 and 25.

The Board does **not** mean to suggest that the issue in **dis-**pute is so clear of resolution that reasonable minds might not differ in determining the appropriate application of the Agreement to the facts presented in this dispute. Nevertheless, **numerous** Awards rendered by a number of Referees have consistently determined that mandatory attendance at classes such as those in issue in this **dis-**pute, do not constitute "work, time or service" so as to require compensation under the various **Agreements**. Because of the **consis-**tent holdings of prior Referees, we are reluctant to **overturn** the multitude of Awards.

The fact that certain Carrier Officials may have incorrectly stated an entitlement to premium pay does not, in the view of the Board, bind the Carrier under the facts and circumstances of this record, nor is there persuasive arguments that the Carrier was incorrect in recouping overpayments made to certain of the Claimants.

We will deny the claim.

FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:

That the parties waived oral hearing;

That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier **and** Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;

That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and

That the Agreement was not violated.

A W A R D

Claim denied.

NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of Third Division

ATTEST:

A. W. Pauls
Executive Secretary

Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this **12th** day of **July 1974**.