CROSSING CRAFT
BOUNDARIES (6) This is not the first
occasion that Carriers have required employees to cross craft boundaries and perform
duties of another craft.
A sampling of awards addressing the subject of crossing
craft boundaries have held that Carrier erred by requiring employees to do so.
In First
Division Award No. 14225 (Weeks) a yardmaster performed the duty of assisting
a yard crew by passing signals to the engineer. In sustaining the claim the majority held
in part:
"Claim by yardman first out on the extra board for
minimum day on account of the yardmaster performing switchmen's work.
"A three man crew was switching a 26 car train. The
engine was behind a scale house. The yardmaster assisted in passing signals to the
engineer. This was a duty which should have been performed by another yardman. While this
in and of itself is not a grave violation of the rules, it must not be permitted as it
would encourage working smaller crews than ordinarily required and allowing them to accept
assistance from whoever was available which might cause accidents.
"The violation of the rules is admitted but a
request is made for no penalty. However, it has been consistently held in previous
awards that the chief means of redress by employes for violation of such rules is to file
time claims." (Emphasis ours)
In First Division Award No. 20258
(Abernethy) a yardmaster doubled over a departing train which entailed making
a cut on cars, throwing one or more switches and flagging automobile traffic. The Carrier
in that dispute, as here, argued "no work belonging exclusively to yardmen was
performed" and "no standing to claim lost earnings." The majority rejected
these arguments. In sustaining the claim, it was held in part:
"We find that Yardmaster Camborn did assist the road
crew double Train No. 761 on September 15 and 17, 1953; that in so doing he performed work
which for years prior thereto had been performed by a yardman assigned to a yard engine
working in the vicinity.
"This Division has heretofore held, and so holds in
this case, that yardmasters performing service such as that complained of here do so in
violation of the yard agreement. . . ."
First Division Award No. 21637
was adopted without the assistance of a referee. The majority sustained the claim because
a Roadmaster threw switches which are customarily performed by a trainman.
In First Division Award No. 22648 (O'Brien)
the majority relied on previous awards addressing the same subject as precedent in its
holding. Sustaining the claim, the majority held in part:
"It is further matter of undisputed fact that on
claim date, Yardmaster Millhoff threw a switch in connection with the movement of a cut of
cars he was supervising.
"This Division has sustained similar claims, Awards
Nos. 14225, 20258, 20231 and 21637, and they are applicable here. . .
."
In Third Division Award No. 11072 (Dorsey)
the majority, in sustaining the claim, held in part:
"The Railway Labor Act does not deal with a
Carrier's assignment of work. This Board determines issues concerning assignment of work
only from interpretation and construction of existing agreements between the parties in
the light of the law of contracts plus history, tradition, and custom in the industry. In
drawing conclusions that lie beyond the direct expression of the text, the Board resorts
to elements known from and given in the text - conclusions which are in the spirit, though
not within the letter of the text. Such conclusions have the same legal recognition as
conclusions which are in the letter of the text.
* * *
"In general, it is a well established principle of
labor law that a collective bargaining agreement reserves to the employes in the
collective bargaining unit the performance of the work of the positions within the unit
when the employer requires the performance of such work. There may, of course, be
expressed exceptions. In addition, there may be unstated exceptions which the parties can
be found to have intended in view of history, tradition or custom. Here we find no
evidence to support an exception, expressed or implied.
"A collective bargaining contract which, absent
expressed or implied exception, does not vest the right to the work, when required, in the
employes within the collective bargaining unit would have form without substance. The work
is the catalyst which gives substance to the Rules pertaining to rates of pay, hours of
work, seniority, working conditions, etc. If the Carrier remained free to assign,
unilaterally, the work to whosoever it chooses, crossing craft and class lines, the over
twenty (20) Rules in the Agreement, here being interpreted and applied, would be for
naught in that they would have meaning only at the whim of Carrier."
Each of the foregoing awards have sustained the
Employees' position when claim was made when other employees performed work customarily
and historically performed by their craft.
Of greater importance are the following Fourth Division
Awards. These awards sustained the yardmasters' position when claim was submitted because
the Carrier, in the exercise of its managerial prerogative, required them to perform
duties customarily and historically performed by other crafts.
In Fourth Division Award No. 2104 (Weston)
a yardmaster was required to ride an engine in order to have the proper number of
employees so as to comply with a full crew law. The majority rejected as controlling a
portion of the yardmasters' agreement that stated ". . . the yardmaster shall perform
such other work as may be directed." In sustaining the claim the majority held in
part:
"Carrier emphasizes Rule 1 of the Agreement, which
provides that `The duties of Yardmaster shall consist generally in the supervision of, or
in assisting in the supervision of, the work of employes engaged in making and breaking up
trains, in the movement of cars within the yard to which the yardmaster is assigned, in
general yard switching, and in the calling of crews; and, in addition, the yardmaster
shall perform such other and further work as may be directed.' The clause, `The yardmaster
shall perform such other and further work as may be directed' is not sufficiently broad to
authorize Carrier to ignore craft lines and use yardmasters to discharge firemen's
responsibilities or perform other services that are completely unrelated to the yardmaster
duties specified in other portions of Rule 1. While the claimants did not work while in
the engine cabs, they did perform service merely by being there. There is no evidence of
past practice or of any other circumstance that supports Carrier's case, and we find no
basis for denying this claim. ...we will sustain the claim in its entirety."
In Fourth Division Award No. 2928 (O'Brien)
the majority sustained the claim by holding the Carrier erred in requiring the yardmaster
to perform work customarily and historically performed by trainmen. It was held in part:
"... We agree with the Organization's contention
that during this period Carrier has required the claimants to perform duties outside the
scope of their collective bargaining agreement. The work performed by yardmasters, prior
to the yard being placed on full automatic operation, was car retarder work which has on
this property been the work of trainmen or switchmen and cannot be considered incidental
to the duties of a yardmaster. It is immaterial that the work merely consisted of moving a
lever or pressing a button on a console, as Carrier contends, as this Board considers the
kind and character of the work controlling rather than the method of performing it. And in
the present claim, the work performed during the claim period was clearly car retarder
work although admittedly it was performed in the tower and not physically in the yard.
* * *
"Having found a violation of the Yardmasters
Agreement during the period in question, we conclude that damages should be awarded even
though no claimant suffered any monetary loss during this period."
In Fourth Division Award No. 2968 (O'Brien)
the majority rejected in that dispute the same arguments relied on by Carrier in the case
at bar, i.e., general Scope Rule, no pay due claimant. In sustaining the claim, the
majority held in part:
"Carrier denied the claim contending that the Scope
Rule in question is general in nature and merely identifies the class of employees covered
by the Agreement. It does not prohibit assignment of the work in question to employees
covered by the Yardmasters Agreement. Thus, Carrier maintains, the Rule was not violated
when claimant was required to service the cabin cars.
"This Board concludes that the work of servicing
cabin cars is definitely not work belonging to the yardmaster craft. In the claim
before us Carrier arbitrarily ignored craft lines and used a yardmaster to perform duties
completely alien to those duties accruing to yardmasters through the application of the
Yardmasters Agreement. The servicing of cabin cars is not generally recognized as
yardmaster work and Carrier violated claimant's contractual rights by requiring him to
perform them. And since the Agreement was violated we feel that claimant is entitled
to damages as claimed." (Emphasis ours)
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